

ETHNICITY, IDENTITY, STATEHOOD AND CULTURE AS FACTORS OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT AND LANGUAGE POLICY: THEORETICAL CONTEXT

The article is devoted to analyzing the relationship between language and language policy, on one hand, and ethnicity, identity, statehood and culture, on the other hand. On this basis, the author expanded theoretical understanding of the issues of language and politics, language in politics and politics in language, and thus the problem of relationship between language and politics. It was argued that the relationship studied is always multifaceted and almost never is subjected to one-vector systematization, since language is politicized very often. In general, it was stated that the official means of communication, which have historically been and still remain national or ethnic languages, are characterized by both advantages and disadvantages. However, language is inextricably linked to culture, ethnicity and identity, and the latter ones are linked to the economy. Therefore, language is not only a means of communication and an element of culture, but also a socio-political tool.

Keywords: language, language policy, nation, ethnicity, identity, statehood, culture.

ETNICZNOŚĆ, TOŻSAMOŚĆ, PAŃSTWO I KULTURA JAKO CZYNNIKI ROZWOJU JĘZYKA I POLITYKI JĘZYKOWEJ: KONTEKST TEORETYCZNY

Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie relacji między językiem i polityką językową z jednej strony a etnicznością, tożsamością, państwowością i kulturą z drugiej. Na tej podstawie autor poszerzył teoretyczne rozumienie problematyki języka i polityki, języka w polityce i polityki w języku, a tym samym problemu relacji między językiem a polityką. Argumentowano, że badana relacja jest zawsze wieloaspektowa i prawie nigdy nie jest poddawana jednowektowej systematyzacji, ponieważ język jest bardzo często upolityczniany. Ogólnie stwierdzono, że oficjalne środki komunikacji, które historycznie były i nadal pozostają językami narodowymi lub etnicznymi, charakteryzują się zarówno zaletami, jak i wadami. Język jest jednak nierozzerwalnie związany z kulturą, pochodzeniem etnicznym i tożsamością, a te ostatnie z gospodarką. Dlatego język jest nie tylko środkiem komunikacji i elementem kultury, ale także narzędziem społeczno-politycznym.

Słowa kluczowe: język, polityka językowa, naród, etniczność, tożsamość, państwowość, kultura.

ЕТНІЧНІСТЬ, ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ, ДЕРЖАВНІСТЬ ТА КУЛЬТУРА ЯК ЧИННИКИ РОЗВИТКУ МОВИ І МОВНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ

У статті проаналізовано взаємозв'язок між мовою і мовною політикою, з однієї сторони, та етнічністю, ідентичністю, державністю і культурою, з іншої сторони. На цій підставі було розширено теоретичне розуміння з приводу проблематики мови і політики, мови у політиці і політики в мові, а відтак й проблематики взаємозв'язку мови та політики. Аргументовано, що досліджуваний взаємозв'язок завжди є різностороннім та майже ніколи не піддається одновекторній систематизації, оскільки мову дуже часто політизують. Загалом на цій підставі констатовано, що офіційні засоби комунікації, якими історично були і поки що залишаються національні чи етнічні мови, характеризуються як перевагами, так і недоліками. Однак мова нерозривно пов'язана з культурою, етнічністю й ідентичністю, а останні – з економікою. А тому мова – це не тільки засіб спілкування і елемент культури, а й соціально-політичне знаряддя.

Ключові слова: мова, мовна політика, нація, етнічність, ідентичність, держава, культура.

It is well known that language is or at least can be an instrument and element of nation- and state-building, as it relates to the ethno-political phenomena of nationalism, national minorities and national identity¹. Language not only plays an instrumental role as a means of communication, but also has an extremely important symbolic role as an expression of the identity of such social groups and communities as ethnic groups, tribes, regions, nations and states. Their design and development is often (if not most often) the result or object of nationalism. So it is hardly surprising that the connection between language, on the one hand, and nationalism and identity, on the other, is so important. Especially given that many researchers believe that modern states and the nationalist movements that shape them are the result of modernization and industrialization.

E. Gellner notes in this regard that nationalism is primarily a political principle, according to which any «political and national units must be appropriate.»² This means that a certain group of people becomes a nation only when the members of that group firmly recognize certain mutual rights and responsibilities of each other as a result of their joint membership in such a group. In addition, P. Alter³ argues that the political nation is formed exclusively in the course of internal political transformation, in particular through the acquisition of a common language, judicial and administrative system, government and political ideals.

¹ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.; Nelson D., Language, identity and war, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2002, vol. 1, s. 3–22.

² Alter P., *Nationalism*, Wyd. Edward Arnold 1991, s. 15.

³ Alter P., *Nationalism*, Wyd. Edward Arnold 1991, s. 15.

As a result, the defining characteristics that are promoted as part of national identity are consciously and subjectively, and sometimes politically, chosen and nurtured at both the state and personal levels. A clear example of this is the situation regarding the choice of French as the national / state language in France, even though historically it has been spoken as a mother tongue by less than half of the population.

Similarly, J. Herder substantiated the central role of language in nationalism, the construction of national identity and diversity. He approached the issue of language in terms of three dominant categories - the principle of interaction, the concept of self-awareness and the doctrine of diversity⁴.

The scholar argued that language is concerned with interaction, besides it represents self-awareness and self-identification, hence supports diversity. Therefore, language is directly related to nationalism, a self-conscious movement that seeks to protect its differences. As a matter of fact, it is thanks to the language that people "grow up" to understand themselves and then share this knowledge with those who speak the same language. Thus, such a common language of a certain community often unites its members and at the same time allows them to distinguish themselves from other language communities. Furthermore, language is a means of communication with the past and securing the future for any group. As a result, language embodies a living manifestation of historical "growth" and a psychological matrix in which a person's awareness of his original social heritage is formed. Accordingly, all those who share a certain historical tradition based on language form a cultural or political nation⁵.

J. Fishman, has made a similar conclusion and points out that language not only connects with the past, but also forms the legitimacy and authenticity of the nation's sense⁶. Accordingly, to deprive a people or nation of its language and speech means to deprive them of almost the only «eternal public good⁷. « Therefore, the connection between language and nationality is indisputable, as they are «inextricably and naturally connected⁸.» E. Keduri goes even further and notes that linguistic nationalism is significantly identified with racial nationalism, because language is associated not only with nationality but also with race. On the one hand, language is an outward sign of the unique identity of national groups and a means of ensuring their continuity, and on the other hand, the language of nations is peculiar to them only because nations are derived from racial roots⁹. Therefore, nations are those social groups that speak original languages¹⁰.

⁴ Barnard F., *Herder on Social and Political Culture*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1969, s. 57.

⁵ Barnard F., *Herder on Social and Political Culture*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1969, s. 57.

⁶ Fishman J., *Language and Nationalism*, Wyd. Newbury House 1973.

⁷ Fishman J., *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1989, s. 105.

⁸ Fishman J., *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1989, s. 278.

⁹ Kedourie E., *Nationalism*, Wyd. Blackwell 1993, s. 66.

¹⁰ Kedourie E., *Nationalism*, Wyd. Blackwell 1993, s. 61.

All this means that language is not only a cultural identification marker, but also a potentially political or politicization tool. This is especially evident in the light of the fact that interference with language can pursue at least two political goals: the preservation of the «pure» or original language of a particular social group; planning with regard to the influence of the language as a factor of political manipulation. In view of this, E. Hobsbawm notes that linguistic nationalism requires state control or at least official recognition of a language, and therefore focuses mainly on issues of power, status, politics and ideology, rather than communication or culture¹¹. In other words, in contrast to the nationalist myth, the language of a certain nation is not the basis of national consciousness, but a kind of «cultural artifact»¹². This is obvious considering the competition between hegemonic and minority languages, since even differences between them can engender «hot» political issues¹³. After all, the engineers of nation-states can choose minority languages as «dialects» in order to worsen their status and meaning, while minority language communities can try to promote their dialects as separate languages in order to strengthen their sense of identity¹⁴.

To illustrate this, B. Anderson notes that the reason for the emergence of certain national communities in Europe was the increased use in public life of a common language other than Latin, and later its standardization through the printing¹⁵. Later, with modernization, urbanization and industrialization, the use of the common language as the language of power in a secularized society spread. Moreover, this was typical even for the societies characterized by a limited level of literacy¹⁶. Accordingly, this means that the printed word in the language has been a prerequisite for the formation of national communities¹⁷, as a result of which language is a marker of national borders and a convenient way to construct national communities, which promotes both ethnolinguistic segregation and assimilation¹⁸.

It is therefore obvious, that the relationship between language, nationality, identity and politics is influenced by the categories of linguistic, sociological, psychological and political order. For example, from a sociological and linguistic point of view, language is the key to how ethnicity is «recognized, interpreted and lived»¹⁹. Instead, from a psychological and political perspective, language is a means of communication between ethnic groups, which owing to the language and by means of it develop a sense of solidarity and preserve their

¹¹ Hobsbawm E., *Nations and Nationalism since 1980*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 110.

¹² Hobsbawm E., *Nations and Nationalism since 1980*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990, s. 111.

¹³ Billig M., *Banal Sage* 1995, s. 32. *Nationalism*, Wyd. Sage 1995, s. 32.

¹⁴ Makoni S., Pennycook A., *Disinventing and reconstituting languages*, [w:] Makoni S., Pennycook A. (eds.), *Disinventing and reconstituting Languages*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 2007, s. 1–47.; Reagan T., Objectification, positivism and language studies: A reconsideration, "Critical Inquiry in Language Studies: An International Journal" 2004, vol. 1, nr. 1, s. 41–60.

¹⁵ Anderson B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Wyd. Verso 1983.

¹⁶ Hutchinson J., Smith A., *Nationalism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994, s. 55.

¹⁷ Hutchinson J., Smith A., *Nationalism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994, s. 60.

¹⁸ Bedolla L., The identity paradox: Latino language, politics and selective dissociation, "Latino Studies" 2003, vol. 1, s. 264–283.

¹⁹ Sankoff G., *The Social Life of Languages*, Wyd. University of Pennsylvania Press 1980.; Fishman J., *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1989, s. 6.

group history, while getting stratified²⁰. Accordingly, the relationship between language and group identity may become paradoxical: on the one hand, language remains a source of pride and group solidarity, but on the other hand, language is also a source of branding. As a result, people who speak about socially disadvantaged varieties of language are alienated from the diversity of their own language and «assess it as inferior, untidy, ugly, illogical or incomprehensible²¹.» Although, by contrast, people by their nature classify themselves as well as other people in the format of groups, they definitely want their own groups to be positively identified²². That is why if other people belong to the groups with a negative social identity, the impulse to dissociate from such groups is triggered. If this is not achieved, then people choose an ethnic identity and work together and collectively to improve the status of their group²³.

This allows us to claim that ethno-political process and, in general, a significant part of politics take place around unequal dichotomy «the language of the majority - the language of the minority (minorities)²⁴». Especially against the background of the fact that at the beginning of the XXI century there were about seven thousand languages in the world²⁵, of which 90 percent are commonly predicted to disappear in another hundred years or so²⁶. This is important because, when it comes to languages, one can't but appeal to the delineation of their speakers, since languages are not just abstractly «dying out». On the one hand, a linguistic «death» occurs when the last speaker of such a language dies. But, on the other hand, the language actually disappears when a certain language community ceases to use it. This is increasingly the case today, with more and more minority languages disappearing from the agenda, as their former speakers find it more prestigious and convenient to speak the language of the majority as a more powerful language providing greater opportunities²⁷. Thus, the decline and extinction of a language always occurs in a bilingual or multilingual context, when the languages of the majority replace the functions of minority languages.

The variants of language deterioration and extinction are many and such processes are constantly occurring. Various languages have seen the decline, prosperity and death as well as adaptation to new realities and changing circumstances. However, what qualitatively and quantitatively distinguishes the situation today is the unprecedented scale of the process

²⁰ Milroy L., Language and Group Identity, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 1982, vol. 3, s. 209–210.

²¹ Milroy L., Language and Group Identity, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 1982, vol. 3, s. 209.

²² Tajfel H., Turner J., *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*, [w:] Austin W., Worchel S. (eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Wyd. Nelson Hall 1986, s. 7–24.

²³ Padilla A., Perez W., Acculturation, Social Identity, and Social Cognition: A New Perspective, *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 2003, vol. 25, s. 35–55.

²⁴ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

²⁵ Lewis M., *Ethnologue: Languages of the World: 16th edn.*, Wyd. SIL International 2009.

²⁶ Krauss M., The world's languages in crisis, *Language* 1992, vol. 68, s. 4–10.; Crystal D., *Language Death*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2000.; Nettle D., Romaine S., *Vanishing Voices: The Extinction of the World's Languages*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.; Harrison K., *When Languages Die: The Extinction of the World's Languages and the Erosion of Human Knowledge*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2007.

²⁷ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

of decline and loss of languages, which some scholars even call «language genocide»²⁸.» Moreover, such a process threatens not only the languages of the minority, but also the languages of the majority, because in recent decades, languages that aspire to the status of global (especially English, Spanish and Chinese)²⁹ have gained special prestige. Therefore, according to forecasts, in the long run there will be only 600 languages or less in the world³⁰, despite the fact that the paradigm of language rights and linguistic ecology has developed in the last half century. Moreover, the latter do not cope with the challenges of a globalized world, when speakers of minority languages choose to abandon their native language voluntarily (without coercion). The situation is much worse when the «language genocide» is not opposed by the authorities³¹, because the decline and disappearance of a language is not only a linguistic but also a political issue related to power, prejudice, competition, subordination and discrimination³². Complementing the situation is the fact that native speakers of endangered languages are typically not successful, but marginal or subordinate sections of the population. In contrast, the extinction of a language is virtually impossible when its speakers are rich and privileged communities³³. This means that the dislocation of a certain community of native speakers may rarely be separated from socio-cultural and socio-economic dislocation of such a community. Therefore, the decline and extinction of language, even theoretically, is always part of a broader process of social, cultural and political nature³⁴.

Although, by contrast, there is really nothing “natural” in the status and prestige attributed to individual majority languages, and nothing “shameful” in the status of minority languages or dialects. From an applied point of view, this, according to M. Billig³⁵, is perhaps easiest to explain by the fact that languages are “created” outside the policy of state formation, and not vice versa. Thus, on the one hand, the independence of Norway and the disintegration of Yugoslavia led to linguistic changes and even formed some new “languages” in the environment where such languages did not previously exist. Such examples emphasize the centrality of the nation-state in the formation and use of language. At the same time, the main role of the nation-state is to determine what the role of language performs and what –does not, as well as to highlight what can be the scale of the consequences of the decline of language³⁶. On the other hand, there are more than 100 nation-states that have actually

²⁸ Skutnabb-Kangas T., *Linguistic Genocide in Education – or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights?*, Wyd. Lawrence Erlbaum 2000.

²⁹ Crystal D., *English as a Global Language*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2003.; Graddol D., *English Next: Why Global English may Mean the End of “English as a Foreign Language”*, Wyd. British Council 2006.

³⁰ Krauss M., The world's languages in crisis, *“Language”* 1992, vol. 68, s. 4–10.

³¹ Skutnabb-Kangas T., *Linguistic Genocide in Education – or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights?*, Wyd. Lawrence Erlbaum 2000.

³² Chomsky N., *Language and Responsibility: Based on Conversations with Mitsou Ronat*, Wyd. Harvester 1979, s. 191.

³³ Crawford J., Endangered Native American languages: what is to be done and why?, *“Journal of Navajo Education”* 1994, vol. 11, nr. 3, s. 3–11.

³⁴ Pennycook A., Language policy and the ecological turn, *“Language Policy”* 2004, vol. 3, nr. 3, s. 213–239.

³⁵ Billig M., *Banal Nationalism*, Wyd. Sage 1995.

³⁶ Gellner E., *Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell 1983, s. 43–50.

adopted English, French, Spanish, or Arabic as their official languages, and another fifty states that have adopted their local languages as their state languages. In addition, there are fifty or more languages that have been granted regional status³⁷. All this means that today nation states officially recognize less than one and a half percent of the world's existing languages³⁸.

And this raises the question of why nation-states and the ideology of nationalism are so central to advancing or resisting the decline of minority languages³⁹. The first and most obvious answer to this question is that we still live in the age of the nation-state. The nation-state remains the basis of the political world order, exercising internal political and legal jurisdiction over its citizens and demanding external rights to sovereignty in the modern interstate system. On this basis, the nation-state is still seen as the apogee of modernity and progress, because in the political context it reflects the triumph of universalism over particularism. However, in the linguistic context, this triumph is evidenced by the replacement of a wide range of language options used within the nation state by one common or several national languages. This process involves the legitimization and institutionalization of the chosen national language. Both processes in combination reach the central requirement of nation-states - cultural and linguistic homogeneity in civil life and the public sector. Interestingly, in this process, the chosen national language is associated with modernity and progress, and all other languages are perceived as related to traditions and obsolete. Thus, the requirement to speak a common language is a historically recent and unique phenomenon for nation-states, as previous forms of political organization required almost no such degree of linguistic homogeneity⁴⁰. This is due to the fact that nation-states are a consequence of nationalism, as a result of which the emphasis on cultural and linguistic homogeneity is based on the notion of the conformity of the nation-state, according to which political and national identities must coincide. Accordingly, the inevitable consequence of such a political imperative is the establishment of an ethnically exclusive and culturally and linguistically homogeneous nation-state as a realm from which minority languages and cultures are effectively displaced. This means that the very concept of the nation-state, combined with its official and standard language in the modern period of political development, is perhaps the greatest threat to both identities and minority languages⁴¹.

In turn, the second answer to this question can be reduced to emphasizing cultural and linguistic homogeneity of nation-states and the inevitable hierarchy of languages. Especially given the historical commitment of such states, and the related, albeit often arbitrary and

³⁷ Williams C., *Ethnic identity and language issues in development*, [w:] Dwyer D., Drakakis-Smith D. (eds.), *Ethnicity and Development: Geographical Perspectives*, Wyd. John Wiley & Sons 1996, s. 45–85.

³⁸ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

³⁹ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

⁴⁰ Dorian N., *Western language ideologies and small-language prospects*, [w:] Grenoble L., Whaley L. (eds.), *Endangered Languages: Language Loss and Community Response*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998, s. 3–21.

⁴¹ Dorian N., *Western language ideologies and small-language prospects*, [w:] Grenoble L., Whaley L. (eds.), *Endangered Languages: Language Loss and Community Response*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998, s. 18.

far-fetched, processes which helped certain languages to acquire the status of national or minority ones. This means that the fundamental principles underlying the model of the nation-state development are now put into question both “from above” and “from below”. “Above” is reflected in the fact that the rise of globalization, together with the growing influence of multinational corporations and supranational political organizations, requires that nation states reassess the framework of their own political and economic sovereignty. This is especially true against the background of increasing role of English in the world, which affects the coverage of other languages. Instead, from below, this is reflected in the fact that minority groups are increasingly enjoying the right to form their own nation-states (through separatist and irredentist movements around the world) or to increasingly have political representation in existing nation-state structures.

In the course of such processes, national identity, its parameters and components are open for discussion, in particular on issues of public multilingualism and multiculturalism⁴². Although, in contrast, the differentiation of group rights over language is threatening and contradictory. Its mitigation is possible only when the complex processes of reconciling the status of language and the separation of identities take place on reciprocal terms and not on terms set by others. In a pragmatic sense, this means that the adaptation of minority language rights may become a political necessity, especially given the dissatisfaction with existing nation-state structures. Otherwise, they could lead to secessionist and irredentist pressure and potential fragmentation of nation-states (as has recently been the case in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia). However, there is a positive dimension in this, because if nation-states are rethought pluralistically and comprehensively, then the potential for recognizing not only greater political but also ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic democracy will increase⁴³.

Therefore, the issue of the relationship between the categories of language and national identity, on the one hand, is complemented or may be supplemented by the phenomenon of war⁴⁴. The fact is that language is often perceived as the formation of a core of identity that can be drawn into conflict, and hence the formation of political discourse, which marks the path to war and peace and the path beyond them. Therefore, eliminating threats to identity through political discourse can be the best and lasting tool for achieving peace. Conversely, in any war, language and discourse are used ruthlessly and deliberately. The fact is that they are reduced to a humanized scale, in which the key aspects of the struggle consist of words. This is particularly noticeable and dangerous when the war begins and continues on the issue of the interconnection of languages, that is, it is linked to issues of identity. However, in contrast, it is language policy in this case (especially in multinational societies) that determines whether there will be a war and vice versa, whether the participants in the war will

⁴² May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

⁴³ Parekh B., *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, Wyd. Macmillan 2000.; Kymlicka W., *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.; Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2007.

⁴⁴ Nelson D., Language, identity and war, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2002, vol. 1, s. 3–22.

find a common life and gradually distance themselves from the “boiling point”⁴⁵. All this is due to the fact that the struggle for identity is the basis of any war and any peace. After all, individuals, groups or nations who are denied recognition or who are at risk of losing their language are the ones who have the greatest potential for violent behavior⁴⁶. This is due to the fact that language is the main, though not the only criterion for dichotomizing people along the lines of “in a group - outside a group”, because if people who speak the same language are gathered together, and language is a pillar of identity, then language is the environment and cause of interethnic conflicts⁴⁷. This means that generating or avoiding conflicts can be closely linked to language policy and socio-economic conditions, which improve the conditions and prospects for one language compared to other languages⁴⁸. Therefore, the language and language policy, which best affirm the diversity of identities, are best at protecting peace and opposing war.

On the other hand, the issue of the relationship between language and identity, even in the face of globalization, which significantly undermines the role of language in the world⁴⁹, is complemented by the need to analyze the place of culture in this context, including intercultural dialogue and multiculturalism⁵⁰. This is particularly relevant considering the fact that the cosmopolitan perspectives inherent in science are unable to explain linguistic transformations in the context of globalization⁵¹. Therefore, they need a separate analysis within the paradigm of liberal multiculturalism (presented by V. Kimlichka, S. May and E. Hobsbawm) and group rights on the protection of languages and cultures. Perhaps the main reason for this is the fact that language is especially important in the debate on globalization, especially against the background of different options for the transformation of the nation state.

In this context, it is important that in the mid-90's of the twentieth century V. Kimlichka developed his liberal political theory of group rights, which became decisive for the development of linguistic diversity in the world. The researcher noted that most of the universal categories within the liberal tradition are imperfect and argued that “the right to freedom of speech does not define what the appropriate language policy should be⁵².” Instead, the scholar set the trend of explaining linguistic diversity on the basis of a liberal multicultural approach to the argumentation of group rights, which has become a powerful theoretical basis for the modern struggle for linguistic diversity and minority languages. V. Kimlichka's version of

⁴⁵ Nelson D., Language, identity and war, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2002, vol. 1, s. 3–22.

⁴⁶ Billig M., *Banal Nationalism*, Wyd. Sage 1995, s. 13–36.

⁴⁷ Edwards J., *Language, Society and Identity*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell 1985, s. 1–10.

⁴⁸ Nelson D., Language, identity and war, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2002, vol. 1, s. 3–22.

⁴⁹ Williams G., *The Knowledge Economy, Language and Culture*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 2010, s. X.

⁵⁰ Ives P., *Global English and the limits of liberalism: Confronting global capitalism and challenges to the nation-state*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Language Policy and Political Economy: English in a Global Context*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2015, s. 48–71.; Hobsbawm E., *Are All Tongues Equal? Language, culture, and national identity*, [w:] Barker P. (ed.), *Living as Equals*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997, s. 85–98.

⁵¹ Ives P., Cosmopolitanism and Global English: Language Politics in Globalisation Debates, *Political Studies* 2010, vol. 58, s. 516–535.

⁵² Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Clarendon 1995, s. 5.

liberalism formed the basis of one of the most important problems of practical politics and political theory of the late twentieth - early twentieth century. - identity policies and issues of multiculturalism, which in parallel relate to the consequences of increasing migration processes and the role, efficiency and framework of the nation state in the era of globalization.

This is, probably most evident in the fact that the central element of the scholar's construct is the role of language - as "the best hope for the creation of just and comprehensive societies around the world"⁵³ - in designing multiculturalism. The scientist insists that group rights, including language rights, are fully compatible with liberalism. In other words, the researcher, recognizing that all liberal democracies, like other regimes, inevitably participate in nation-building, i.e. the promotion of certain types of identity, culture and language, argues that liberalism can remain liberal as long as human rights (including and language) are not violated by the state or other groups. At the same time, internal restrictions are fully compatible with external protection, which "provides for the claims of a particular group against society as a whole."⁵⁴ Accordingly, the majority or dominant language groups, even by means of the democratic mechanisms of the nation-state, should not hold a monopolized position in nation-building, as the minority or subordinate groups should also be able to work to build a political nation. This means that a liberal state focused on equality must promote not only diversity but also the role and rights of individual language groups, even though such a state may use collective rights to ensure protection⁵⁵. Thus, V. Kimlichka rejects the idea of group rights if they allow a particular cultural, linguistic or ethnic group to require other people to "attend a certain church or adhere to traditional gender roles", but for the situations where this poses a threat⁵⁶. This means that culture cannot be perceived as a religion, that is, as "something that people should freely aspire to in their private lives and that does not concern the state"⁵⁷.

Accordingly, given the vagueness of the definition of culture, V. Kimlichka tries to make its definition clearer and more substantive. The scholar notes that culture, or rather "societal culture", is a "territorially concentrated culture that focuses on a common language, which is used in a wide range of social institutions in both public and private life" (including education, the media) information, law, economics, etc.), but "not on common religious beliefs, family customs or personal lifestyles."⁵⁸ Therefore, language is the main tool for the reconstruction of liberalism, because it is most consistent with the construct of group rights, i.e. a multicultural society or "societal culture"⁵⁹. Given this, V. Kimlichka distinguishes several

⁵³ Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2007, s. 25.

⁵⁴ Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Clarendon 1995, s. 35.

⁵⁵ Ives P., *Global English and the limits of liberalism: Confronting global capitalism and challenges to the nation-state*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Language Policy and Political Economy: English in a Global Context*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2015, s. 48–71.

⁵⁶ Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Clarendon 1995, s. 36.

⁵⁷ Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2007, s. 23.

⁵⁸ Kymlicka W., *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001, s. 25.

⁵⁹ Kymlicka W., *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001, s. 55–66.

types of minorities, in particular by demarcating the different types of rights assigned to them. The first type of right concerns self-government, which corresponds to “national groups” within multinational states. The second type concerns polyethnic rights of those groups who “voluntarily” immigrate and leave their “social culture.” Finally, the third variety is determined by the special representation rights of groups such as racial minorities, women and the poor. In this context, national groups mean persons who share a common language and social institutions, but group rights to self-government are appropriate only for those national groups that fully meet the criteria of “social culture” and have a common language and public institutions⁶⁰.

On this basis, S. May argues that there should be a distinction between “social cultures” that are “potentially self-governing⁶¹” and ethnic groups and groups of immigrants (minorities) who “left their national community to enter another society.⁶²” Thus, one can not only uphold the importance of citizenship rights, but also develop an understanding of the importance of cultural membership within such rights⁶³. However, S. May notes that any notion of group cultural identity must be treated specifically, especially through the prism of its possible legitimization⁶⁴. The fact is that the link between cultural identity and group language rights is ambiguous⁶⁵, though important. This is mainly due to the fact that each culture expresses a special way of seeing and perceiving the world, along with a certain way of responding to its challenges, including language⁶⁶. What is important in this case is the historically changing relationship between language, identity and culture, as well as how these issues interact with changes in the dynamics of capitalism, production processes and goods, as well as the various strategies and powers that states try to mobilize to adapt to such changes⁶⁷. As a result, the theory of multiculturalism insists on the centrality of language and criticizes the ideal of state neutrality in matters of cultural differences⁶⁸.

In this context, it is interesting to note the the observation of E. Hobsbawm⁶⁹, who argues that the question of the nation arises due to the fact that state decisions on the conditions of public use of languages are of great political importance, especially because states typically (though sometimes erroneously) are identified with nations. This is relevant considering the

⁶⁰ Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Clarendon 1995, s. 31.

⁶¹ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012, s. 120.

⁶² Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Clarendon 1995, s. 19.

⁶³ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*. London: Routledge, 2012. P. 123–124.

⁶⁴ May S., *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*, Wyd. Routledge 2012, s. 131.

⁶⁵ Kymlicka W., *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Wyd. Clarendon 1995, s. 90.

⁶⁶ Barnard F., *Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History*, Wyd. McGill-Queen's University Press 2003, s. 6.

⁶⁷ Ives P., *Global English and the limits of liberalism: Confronting global capitalism and challenges to the nation-state*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Language Policy and Political Economy: English in a Global Context*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2015, s. 48–71.

⁶⁸ Haque E., *Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual Framework: Language, Race, and Belonging in Canada*, Wyd. University of Toronto Press 2012.; Young I., A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka's Ethnic-Nation Dichotomy, “*Constellations*” 1997, vol. 4, nr. 1, s. 48–53.

⁶⁹ Hobsbawm E., *Are All Tongues Equal? Language, culture, and national identity*, [w:] Barker P. (ed.), *Living as Equals*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997, s. 85–98.

fact that not only their citizens but also immigrants and refugees live in different sovereign states. Thus, the fallacy of the identification of nation and state is quite obvious, because only in the past the inhabitants of a state were identified with the “imaginary community”, which was united by language, culture, ethnicity, etc., and thus the ideal was linguistically, culturally and ethnically homogeneous population. Instead, today the desire for “ethnic cleansing” is dangerous and completely unrealistic, because among more than 200 countries in the world, only a small number of policies correspond to its historical understanding as a nation-state. In addition, even in retrospect, such a desire to present the state of affairs of statehood through the prism of the past is erroneous, because the unity of the nation has historically been positioned as a political rather than socio-anthropological indicator of state development. After all, the state has historically been shaped as a unity, which as a sovereign people decided to live within national legal frameworks, regardless of culture, language and ethnic composition of the population. This leads to the problems of multilingualism and multiculturalism, because historically the existence of states with different languages and cultures is very common or at least no less common than the availability of states characterized by a single homogeneous language and culture. This is compounded by the fact that historically in the already formed nation-states only a small proportion of the population spoke a language that is now state or official (for example, about half the population of France at the end of the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century, the moment of its unification in the second half of the XIX century, a small share of the population of India in the early XIX century.).

Instead, the need for a single national language was formed when ordinary citizens became part of the state. Moreover, the initial process of language standardization initially pursued only democratic goals, contrary to cultural and national ones, since the population of different countries needed to understand the procedural minimum of the functioning of the political systems in which they lived. The situation was more complicated in countries where there was not a single predominant oral or even written language or where one language community was dissatisfied with the higher status of the language of another community. Accordingly, the privileged use of any language as the only language of instruction and / or culture is necessarily historically linked to political and ideological or, at best, pragmatic considerations⁷⁰. However, the situation in the late twentieth - early twenty-first century, has changed significantly, because: the world no longer lives solely due to the culture of reading and writing; the world is no longer constructed on the idea of a single common national language, but instead is increasingly moving to multilingualism; the world lives in an age when at least one language (primarily English) has the status of a global language, at least in business, education, science, international relations, and so on. All this proves the existence of an uneven relationship between languages in multinational societies, although in general this does not contradict the principle that languages should not be interchangeable.

⁷⁰ Hobsbawm E., *Are All Tongues Equal? Language, culture, and national identity*, [w:] Barker P. (ed.), *Living as Equals*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997, s. 85–98.

At the same time, this is the basis for distinguishing a cohort of purely political or politicized languages that have been created / restored specifically and as symbols of nationalist or regionalist aspirations and separatist, irredentist or secessionist ideas⁷¹. A striking example is the so-called Cornish language, which “died out” in the middle of the eighteenth century⁷², but today we witness numerous efforts not so much to revive but to politicize it, in particular with a view to separating Cornwall from England. Such artificially constructed languages can either achieve political success, like Hebrew in Israel, that is, they can become truly spoken and living languages, or they can fail, like nationalist poets’ attempts to turn the dialect of southern Scotland into a literary language in the interwar period⁷³. Besides, some of the languages used are politically modified. This was the case, for example, with the intensification of the Croatian language, which was developed by establishing additional benefits in the form of prestigious jobs for those who used it, or with the “purity” of the Czech language, which was specially purified from German words and elements⁷⁴.

Hence, the results of the research provide a basis for the conclusion that the officially recognized means of communication, which have historically been and still remain different national or ethnic languages, have both advantages and disadvantages. Among the main advantages - functional development and a stable basis in the form of relations between ethnic groups and states that have material and power resources. Among the main advantages - functional development and a stable basis in the form of relations between ethnic groups and states that have the material and power resources to promote national or ethnic languages.

Instead, among the key shortcomings is the fact that the richness of the language makes it difficult to master it as a foreign language, and national affiliation causes socio-political tension and competition. Therefore, any language not in the mouths of its native speakers necessarily undergoes transformations in the direction of simplification and “adaptation” to another native language, which, in the end, reaches such a scale when the correct (according to native speakers) language is used only by a small part population. More importantly, however, language is inextricably linked to culture, ethnicity and identity, and the latter to the economy. Therefore, language is not only a means of communication and an integral element of culture, but also a socio-political tool.

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⁷¹ Hobsbawm E., *Are All Tongues Equal? Language, culture, and national identity*, [w:] Barker P. (ed.), *Living as Equals*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997, s. 85–98.

⁷² Sims-Williams P., A New Brittonic Gloss on Boethius: ud rocashaas, “*Cambrian Medieval Celtic Studies*” 2005, vol. 50, s. 77–86.

⁷³ Hobsbawm E., *Are All Tongues Equal? Language, culture, and national identity*, [w:] Barker P. (ed.), *Living as Equals*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997, s. 85–98.

⁷⁴ Jernudd B., Shapiro M., *The Politics of Language Purism*, Wyd. Mouton de Gruyter 1989, s. 218.

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